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Abstract: The EU Temporary and Agency Work Directive created a right of equal treatment 
on working time and pay for agency workers compared to direct workers. This article asks, 
what justifications are there for any different treatment? Using job security rights as an 
example, this article explores the framework for regulation of employment agencies and the 
common law position of agency workers. It highlights, first, that profit-making agencies were 
frowned on historically by international law, and that principled regulation is required to 
prevent abuse. It shows, secondly, that the common law test of ‘mutuality of obligation’, that 
removes employment rights for agency workers, is legally and logically unsound. It then 
illustrates, third, that a recently developed test for implied contracts, which leads agency 
workers to have no employer at all, pays incomplete regard to the full authority on contractual 
and statutory construction. These loopholes are unfair and inefficient and amount to an 
unjustified subsidy for agency work. Simple recognition is needed that agency workers should 
not be treated differently, because work through an agency is work like any other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After being dismissed from the Cowley Mini factory in February 2009, an agency 
worker of over two years, John Cunningham, told The Independent this:1 
 
They’ve planned this for months and we’ve only just been told - one hour’s 
notice. We’ve been given a week’s pay for an enforced week off, which I 
suppose is a week’s notice. I don’t know what’s going to happen to me and 
my family. It’s very scary. 
 
There have, since early 2009, been many reasons to be optimistic about the 
improvement of agency workers’ positions in the United Kingdom. Due to more 
high profile press coverage and recent legislative reform, agency workers like John 
are gradually becoming less invisible. In 2005 the Labour Force Survey reported 
there were fewer than 260,000. Now the number is generally acknowledged to be 
over 1,300,000.2  
Yet it is clear that most agency workers are being treated differently under the 
Employment Rights Act 1996.3 This gives rights to ‘employees’. ‘Employee’ has a 
common law meaning, so the self-employed do not benefit from minimum, 
mandatory rights.4 Take the example of job security. After one month employees 
have the right to one week’s notice before dismissal. After one year employees 
have a right to be dismissed fairly. After two years employees have the right to two 
weeks’ notice and redundancy pay.5 The notice period (always substitutable with a 
payment reflecting wages, in lieu of notice) and the right to redundancy increase 
according to the number of years in employment.6 Had he been a Mini employee, 
                                                     
1 A. Jones, ‘Fury as 850 Mini Workers Given Hour’s Notice’ (16 February 2009) The Independent; T. 
Macalister and H. Pidd, ‘Uproar in Cowley as BMW Confirms 850 Job Cuts at Mini Factory’ (16 February 
2009) The Guardian; Editor, ‘Job Cuts at Mini Spark Angry Rows’ (16 February 2009) BBC News online; in 
September 2009 BMW’s press officer told reporters that temporary workers were being rehired, see J. 
Reed and R. Milne, ‘BMW Refuels Mini Adventure with Two New Models for Oxford Plant’ (3 
September 2009) Financial Times. 
2 See the Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Survey: Quarterly Supplement (April 2005) 20; 
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Implementation of the Agency Workers Directive: 
A Consultation Paper (May 2009) 4. 
3 Employment Rights Act 1996 (hereafter ‘ERA 1996’). 
4 Examples include the right to a written statement of one’s contract (s 1), to request flexible working 
time (s 80F), to have time off to raise children (Part VIII), to state compensation for lost earnings when 
an employer enters an insolvency procedure (s 182), to information and consultation about business 
changes and redundancies (ICER 2004 r 20), or to not be dismissed for union involvement (TULRCA 
1992, s 152). 
5 ERA 1996, n 3 above, ss 86(1)(a), 94, 135. Unfair dismissal functions less as an assurance that dismissals 
will be objectively ‘fair’, but that an employer should not dismiss if it is so unreasonable that ‘no 
reasonable employer would have dismissed,’ British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91. Also, if a 
disciplinary procedure is not followed, but the same result would have been reached if it had, the 
dismissal is unaffected, Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1988] ICR 142. 
6 An employee aged between 22 and 40 receives one week’s pay for each year she has worked. This is 
reduced to half a week’s pay for the time worked before her 21st birthday, and increased to one and a half 
week’s pay for years worked past her 41st birthday (ERA 1996, n 3 above, s 162). 
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John would have had two weeks’ notice before dismissal and received a 
redundancy payment. Furthermore, because over 100 people were being 
dismissed, he would have received 90 days warning and consultation.7 But John 
was not considered an employee. He was an agency worker. He was by-him-self-
employed. 
The implementation of the EU Temporary and Agency Work Directive 
(2008/104/EC, the ‘Directive’) is the occasion for reform. The Directive enforces 
transnational minimum standards on agency work for the first time. Many UK 
agency workers are treated as employees, with employee rights.8 But many are not, 
and all live in legal limbo.9 This article draws on the example of job security rights 
to argue no justification exists for any differential treatment. The first part 
examines the emerging regulatory framework of agency work. The second part 
analyses the common law definition of ‘employee’ and demonstrates why the 
current component of ‘mutuality of obligation’ is defective, circular and 
unprincipled. The third part focuses on the ‘employer’, and shows that recent 
decisions have overlooked an important range of authority on implied terms and 
contracts. The article rests on the presumption that different treatment of agency 
workers requires positive justification, but suggests that such justifications for 
different treatment are absent. Given the present economic instability and 
potential for persistent long-term unemployment, it is more important than ever 
that clear rules exist to promote fairness and productive efficiency. 
 
 
 
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE DIRECTIVE AND 
REGULATION 
 
NEW DIRECTIONS? 
 
The new Directive adds a tenth category of protected status to workplace equality 
policy.10 Originally intended to accompany directives on fixed-term and part-time 
work,11 it is classic anti-discrimination legislation. It creates the right to equal 
treatment in ‘basic working and employment conditions’. This means the pay 
                                                     
7 TULRCA 1992, n 4 above, ss 188-189. 
8 See, eg, McMeechan v Secretary of State for Employment [1997] ICR 549, Manpower UK Ltd v Vjestica 
(Unreported, 18.10.2005) UKEAT/0397/05/DM. 
9 See Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 318 at [42]; [2001] IRLR 269, 275. 
10 The number ten comes from the current array of statutes and statutory instruments. The ten are (1) 
agency work, (2) part time work, (3) fixed term employment, (4) union membership, (5) gender, (6) race, 
(7) disability, (8) age, (9) sexual orientation, and (10) belief. The latter six were codified in the Equality Act 
2010, which explicitly protects marital status and gender reassignment as separate statuses (ss 5-12). 
11 See EU Temporary and Agency Work Directive (2008/104/EC), Preamble (2) and (4) and the Fixed 
Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002, and Part-time Workers 
(Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000; note the recent exemption under FTER 
2002 r 19(1). 
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workers receive and their working time.12 Equality in benefits for women caring 
for children and anti-discrimination provisions are added.13 Agency workers will 
have a pay and working time claim compared to the hypothetical conditions ‘that 
would apply if they had been recruited directly by that undertaking to occupy the 
same job’.14 It therefore appears direct staff cannot benefit from the Directive, 
though most evidence suggests that UK agency workers are chiefly paid less than 
direct staff for the same jobs.15 When calculating working time or pay it may be 
that a court would accept evidence of ‘compensating advantages’,16 for instance 
where an agency worker forgoes membership of a company superannuation plan 
for extra pay per hour. All such benefits could be measured in money. Further 
rights for agency workers that the Directive explicitly enforces deal with workplace 
participation. Article 6 says agency workers are entitled to the same access to 
employment and vocational training facilities. An example could be that an agency 
worker in a government department should be able to access the civil service’s 
internal job advertisement network. This provision reinforces the idea of 
temporary work as a stepping-stone to a secure job, rather than an end in itself.17 
Article 7 requires that agency workers are counted for the purpose of union 
recognition and article 8 requires that agency workers are informed and consulted 
like any other worker. The Directive sets down minimum transnational standards, 
but does not prevent individual countries providing greater protection.18 
The equal treatment principle has a number of exceptions. Article 5(2) allows 
member states to set conditions for differential pay, after consulting social 
partners, if the worker is the agency’s permanent employee and is paid between 
assignments. Article 5(3) allows derogations if made through industry level 
collective agreement. Both pay between assignments and industry level collective 
agreement have stronger traditions in continental Europe and currently matter 
little to the UK context. But both of these provisions show that derogations are 
being allowed where sufficient safeguards exist. As exceptions, European Courts 
would construe them restrictively.19 The safeguards are slim, however, in the 
article 5(4) exception, which allows member states to have a qualifying period for 
equal conditions where social partners have agreed it.20 In the UK, the Trades 
                                                     
12 EU Temporary and Agency Work Directive, ibid, Art 3(1)(f); working time means ‘duration of working 
time, overtime, breaks, rest periods, night work, holidays and public holidays’. 
13 ibid, Art 5(1); it is unclear whether discrimination protection was a necessary change for the UK. See 
Part 4 A below. 
14 ibid, Art 5(1) ‘for the duration of their assignment at a user undertaking, at least those that would apply 
if they had been recruited directly by that undertaking to occupy the same job.’ 
15 eg TUC, Agency Workers: Counting the cost of flexibility (2007) 7. 
16 cf Power v Regent Security Services Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1188; [2008] ICR 442 and GMB v Allen [2008] 
EWCA Civ 810; [2008] ICR 1407. 
17 In 1976, the forerunner of the Recruitment and Employment Confederation supported this view. See, 
The Federation of Personnel Services of Great Britain Ltd, The Private Employment Agencies: A Survey of 
Services to Permanent and Temporary Office Workers (LSE library reference, Folio FHDS/F92) 2. 
18 EU Temporary and Agency Work Directive, n 11 above, Art 9(1). 
19 See, eg, T-14/98 Hautala v Council [1999] ECR II-2489, para 84. 
20 The previous draft, COM (2002) 149 final, mandated a six week qualifying period. 
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Union Congress negotiated twelve weeks with the Confederation of British 
Industry.21 This could change. Member states must ensure ‘an adequate level of 
protection is provided’, a stipulation probably best met if no qualifying period 
existed. It is not entirely clear what principle (other than ‘compromise’) can justify 
any qualifying period, just as one would not wish to have a qualifying period for 
equal treatment of part-time workers, or the elderly. 
Viewed from the perspective of equal treatment, the Directive is welcome.22 
The common law has no generally articulated principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value,23 even though it is axiomatic that like cases should be treated alike.24 
But does the Directive solve a key problem facing UK agency workers, that they 
can be fired at will and have no rights because the common law has not treated 
them as ‘employees’? In article 2 the Directive states its aim to ‘ensure the 
protection of temporary agency workers and to improve the quality of temporary 
agency work […] by recognising temporary-work agencies as employers […]’25 
Does ‘recognising temporary-work agencies as employers’ mean that an agency 
worker must be regarded as an employee of, at least, the agency? Article 3(2) states 
the Directive is without prejudice to the member state’s definition of ‘contract of 
employment’. Yet it is a slight semantic tightrope to say that if A is the ‘employer’ 
of B, then B is not ‘employee’ of A.26 This is an anti-discrimination Directive and 
it is within the competence of the EU to combat social exclusion of agency 
workers.27 The EU need not be taken to have said that member states must 
enforce job security or other employment rights. But if member states do have 
such rights, then arguably a class of workers cannot be left out merely because 
they work through an agency. It could mean that the common law should be 
developed consistently with EU principles. This accords with understandings of 
legislators in the European Parliament.28 But if it is true, why was the Directive not 
clearer? 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
21 Agency Workers: Joint Declaration by the Government, the CBI and the TUC (20 May 2008). 
22 For more detailed treatment, written with reference to the Government’s first consultation, see N. 
Countouris and R. Horton, ‘The Temporary Agency Work Directive: Another Broken Promise?’ (2009) 
38(3) ILJ 329. 
23 cf Transco plc v O’Brien [2002] EWCA Civ 379; [2002] ICR 721, Pill LJ held it broke mutual trust and 
confidence to not improve with permanent staff the redundancy package of a man who had just moved 
from an agency to direct employment. 
24 For (qualified) judicial support of the principle, see Carson v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 41, 77; 
Matadeen v Pointu and Minister of Education and Science [1999] 1 AC 98, 109. 
25 EU Temporary and Agency Work Directive, n 11 above. 
26 See also, ibid, Art 3(1)(c):‘“temporary agency worker” means a worker with a contract of employment 
or an employment relationship with a temporary-work agency with a view to being assigned to a user 
undertaking to work temporarily under its supervision and direction.’ 
27 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art 153(j). 
28 eg C. Moraes MEP, ‘Letter: EU Directive Too Late for Cowley Workers’ (19 February 2009) The 
Guardian. 
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THE DIRECTIVE’S BACKGROUND 
 
Part of the answer may be found in Germany, where recent legal reforms sound a 
striking chime with the new Directive’s scheme.29 In 2004, Gerhard Schröder’s 
Social Democrat government changed its Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz (Employee 
Leasing Act) based on the 2002 Hartz I report.30 They abandoned a two year limit 
on duration of agency work contracts and in return mandated equal treatment on 
pay, working time, parental and anti-discrimination rights.31 The Hartz report 
came at the same time as a previous Draft Agency Worker Directive (COD 
2002/0149) was produced.32 In the 2002 Draft and the new Directive alike, the 
muted position on employee status and further rights mirrored the concerns in 
Germany. Regardless of whether one works through an agency, all German 
workers are already entitled to at least two weeks’ notice.33 The right to fair 
dismissal arises after six months in all German workplaces with over ten 
employees.34 German Works Councils enforce redundancy payments, customarily 
valued at half a month’s pay per year of employment.35 
Even though the 2002 Draft never addressed all the problems of agency 
workers, the TUC pushed for its implementation. Progress was slow. In James v 
Greenwich LBC Mummery LJ remarked of a 2007 Private Member’s Bill, that it was 
‘doomed to failure for lack of support from the Government’.36 But that Bill was 
renamed and reintroduced in early 2008.37 A well organised publicity campaign 
brought the 2008 Bill to pass a second reading. The government resolved to act, 
                                                     
29 See A. Freckmann, ‘Temporary Employment Business in Germany’ (2004) 15(1) International Company 
and Commercial Law Review 7. 
30 See P. Hartz, ‘Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt: Vorschläge der Kommission zum Abbau 
der Arbeitslosigkeit und zur Umstrukturierung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit’ (Berlin 2002) Bericht der 
Kommission, Norbert Bensel et al (43 (2537)); Die Hartz-Reform: Neue Dynamik für den Arbeitsmarkt? 
(Bonn: 2002). Peter Hartz was the former Volkswagen AG labour executive, a member of a German 
public company’s management board devoted specially to staff issues under the Mitbestimmungsgesetz 
(Codetermination Act 1976), s 33.  
31 B. Waas, ‘Temporary Agency Work in Germany: Reflections on Recent Developments’ (2003) 19(3) 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 387; B. Keller, ‘The Hartz Commission 
Recommendations and Beyond: An Intermediate Assessment’ (2003) 19(3) International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 363. 
32 See C. Mortished, ‘UK Turns Against EU Merger Law in Deal with Germany’ (19 May 2003) The Times, 
which suggests that German traded delay of the Agency Worker Directive for Britain’s agreement to 
delay the Takeover Directive. The latter was in fact introduced before long: see EU Directive 
2004/25/EC.  
33 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, s 622(3). After six months, the minimum period is 4 weeks, and the period rises 
up to a seven-year minimum for twenty years of work. See generally, A. Freckmann, ‘Termination of 
Employment Relationships in Germany – Still a Problem’ (2005) 16(1) International Company and Commercial 
Law Review 38. 
34 Kündigungsschutzgesetz, s 1(1). 
35 See S. Konnert, ‘Unfair Dismissal by Reason of Redundancy in Germany’ (2005) 16(11) International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 431, 440. 
36 [2008] EWCA Civ 35 [57], commenting on the Temporary and Agency Workers (Prevention of Less 
Favourable Treatment) Bill. 
37 Temporary and Agency Workers (Equal Treatment) Bill. 
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though through Europe instead. It was agreed that passage in Parliament would 
stop. 
Now that agency standards are being Europeanised, is it enough to enforce 
equal pay and hours? The rationale for all European legislation is that it achieves 
aims which cannot be achieved through national government. Harmonising 
employment rights means individual countries are not forced to undercut one 
another in a regulatory race to the bottom, under temptation to attract 
investment.38 Similarly, responsible employers who wish to treat staff as members, 
not resources, are not undercut by the unscrupulous leading the competition. 
When liberalisation of national laws leads to a globalising economy, law itself 
needs to globalise to support the broadened market. But if this logic is correct, 
then a simple implementation of the Directive will not end the race to the bottom 
in Europe. Without job security rights, British workers can still be seen as ‘low 
cost’, and before long, other countries will cut their standards to compete with us, 
prompting us to become lower cost once more. It might be argued that 
protectionist EU policy will not stop capital flows to developing countries and a 
race to the bottom globally. Yet a plain counter-argument is that European 
legislation will slow that downward spiral, and in the meantime work can be done 
to enforce or raise standards internationally. One cannot begin nowhere. In this 
respect, the International Labour Organisation plays a vital coordinating role. And 
historically it would have had a radical answer to the UK’s problems. It would 
have abolished employment agencies. If employment agencies do not exist, there 
can be no agency workers to treat differently. 
 
WHY NOT ABOLISH AGENCIES? 
 
Though it may seem a far fetched idea to contemporary eyes, abolishing agencies 
was a policy with a long international pedigree.39 An important starting point is 
1912, when the United States Labor Department submitted to Congress 
documentation of abuses by agencies. Across many states new regulations were 
introduced in response. Before long the regulations were challenged under the US 
constitution.40 In Adams v Tanner, an employment agent was prosecuted for 
charging fees to workers after the state of Washington had, following a 
referendum envisaging full abolition, prohibited fees. The US Supreme Court held, 
five to four, that the law was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause. Reading for the majority (White CJ, Day, Van Devanter and Pitney 
                                                     
38 In a company law context, see Brandeis J, Liggett Co v Lee, 288 US 517, 559 (1933), drawing inspiration 
from A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) 206, fn 18. 
39 See generally, T. Martinez, The Human Marketplace: An Examination of Private Employment Agencies (New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 1976); HL Deb vol 343 col 342-346 (Earl of Gowrie); Employment Services 
Agency, Temporary Workers. A Report of an Inquiry for the Employment Services Agency, Social Survey Division, 
Office of Population, Census and Surveys, s 1059 (London: September 1976); and during the short-lived 
Second Republic in France, Décret 8 Mars 1848. 
40 See also, Brazee v Michigan 241 US 340 (1916), where mandatory licensing was held to be compliant with 
the fourteenth amendment, but McReynolds J said obiter dicta that regulation of fees would not be; Ribnik 
v McBride 277 US 350 (1928). 
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JJ) McReynold J argued, ‘there is nothing inherently immoral or dangerous to 
public welfare in acting as paid representative of another to find a position in 
which he can earn an honest living. On the contrary, such service is useful, 
commendable, and in great demand.’41 
He found support for the argument that private employment agencies were 
useful in the fact that many states were establishing free public employment 
agencies. But Brandeis J (with whom Holmes, Clarke and McKenna JJ dissented) 
highlighted the US Labor Department’s accounts of abuse, attempts in over thirty 
states to regulate and have free public agencies compete. He emphasised the 
legitimacy of the view that all methods short of abolition had ultimately failed.42 
Some of the most serious mischief was agencies charging destitute jobseekers 
upfront fees and making no effort to place the worker. Work could last a few days, 
and the agent would split the next fee with the employer and bring in fresh 
replacements. But Brandeis J also emphasised the wider economic effects of 
agencies, quoting from the 1912 US Labor Department report: 
  
They also fail to meet the problem [of unemployment] because they are so 
numerous and are necessarily competitive. With few exceptions, there is no 
cooperation among them. This difficulty is further emphasized by the 
necessity of paying the registration fees required by many agencies; obviously 
the laborer cannot apply to very many if he has to pay a dollar at each one.43 
 
The views in this dissent were shared internationally. After the First World War 
the International Labour Organisation was established through the Treaty of 
Versailles, which proclaimed that since ‘peace can be established only if it is based 
on social justice’, ‘labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or an 
article of commerce’.44 Private employment agencies were seen to be dealing solely 
in the extraction of a worker’s surplus value. So the ILO’s first ever 
Recommendation urged member states, 
 
to prohibit the establishment of employment agencies which charge fees or 
which carry on their business for profit. Where such agencies already exist, it 
is further recommended that they be permitted to operate only under 
government licenses, and that all practicable measures be taken to abolish 
such agencies as soon as possible.45 
 
                                                     
41 244 US 590 (1917). 
42 244 US 601-9 (1917). 
43 244 US 604 (1917). 
44 Part XIII and Art 427; See also, P O’Higgins, ‘Labour Is Not a Commodity - An Irish Contribution to 
International Labour Law’ (1977) 26(3) Industrial Law Journal 225. 
45 ILO Unemployment Recommendation 1919 (No 1), Art 1. 
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The ILO’s Convention No 2 gave the alternative.46 Member states were to 
establish public employment agencies.47 In 1933, Convention No 34 formally 
called for abolition of fee charging agencies. Many continental European countries 
adopted these laws. The United Kingdom never did, and state governments in 
America were bound by the US Supreme Court to reject them, until Franklin 
Roosevelt’s presidency.48 
By 1949 the ILO had changed. Convention No 96 allowed an opt-out, so 
private agencies could exist if monitored through licenses and if fees were 
prohibited.49 But many European countries maintained strict controls on, or 
prohibition of, private agencies till the 1990s. Then the European Court of Justice 
signalled a more active approach to market liberalisation through competition law. 
The leading case, Höfner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH,50 concerned the free public 
employment agency, the German Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Employment 
Office). Its monopoly on work placement services and a corresponding provision, 
that contracts in breach of the exclusive rights were void, were challenged. Many 
normal agencies simply acquired licenses, but the Bundesanstalt had taken a 
different approach to private executive headhunting agencies like Herr Höfner and 
Elser’s. A ‘blind eye’ was turned for the purposes of oversight, but these executive 
agencies still risked that their contracts were unenforceable. The ECJ held that the 
maintenance of exclusive rights could amount to an abuse of a dominant position 
where, as here, a public service was not fully meeting demand.51 The ECJ held that 
competition law could apply to public bodies, as well as private ones, since any 
organisation engaged in ‘economic activity’ would be an ‘undertaking’ subject to 
monopolies regulation.52 Italy was made to abandon a prohibition on private 
agencies in 1997.53 The same year the ILO passed Convention No 181. This 
endorses profit making employment agencies, while recommending licenses, no 
upfront fees and the enforcement of employment rights.54 
It is apparent that under both EU law and US law private agencies could be 
abolished. The Höfner requirement is simply that a public service factually satisfies 
work placement demand. The US Supreme Court renounced Adams in the 1940s. 
Nevertheless, good arguments against abolishing private employment agencies 
exist. Firstly, whether public or private, employment agencies, 
                                                     
46 See also, M. Freedland, P. Craig, C. Jacqueson, and N. Countouris, Public Employment Services and 
European Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007); for the position in the United States, see D.E. Balducchi, R.W. 
Eberts, and C. J. O’Leary, Labor Exchange Policy in the United States (Kalamazoo: WE Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, 2004). 
47 ILO Unemployment Convention 1919 (No 2), Art  2. 
48 Lincoln Union v Northwestern Co 335 US 535 (1949). See also Olsen v State of Nebraska 313 US 236 (1941). 
49 ILO Convention 1949 (No 96); many US states still allow fees, eg New York’s Employment Agency 
Law Art 11; for a useful contemporary overview of the EU member states’ situations, see Opinion of the 
Advocate General in Case 35/70 Manpower SÀRL v Caisse Primaire d'Assurance Maladie de Strasbourg [1971] 
CMLR 222. 
50 Case 41/90 [1991] ECR I-1979. 
51 ibid at [31], now under Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art 102. 
52 See now, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, ibid. 
53 See Case 55/96 Job Centre Coop arl [1997] ECR I-7119. 
54 ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention 1997 (No 181), Arts 3(2), 7(1), 11, and 12.  
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• promote specialisation and expertise in hiring staff. Arguably jobs can be 
more quickly done when the functions of labour are freely divisible to suit 
business’ needs. 
• channel workers to work. They may have a superior network effect to 
alternatives like newspaper advertising. If a worker knows that an agency 
specialises in jobs of a particular field, she may approach the single agency 
rather than writing many applications to many employers. Likewise, 
employers will learn to choose agencies with a reputation for getting staff 
of particular qualifications. 
It can always be argued that since a public service can do all these things, and since 
a public employment agency would not keep a worker attached to its payroll once 
work is found, private agencies should still be abolished and problems regarding 
equality and employment rights need not exist. But it would also appear that in 
this particular industry, 
 
• the existence of a private market does not sap significant expertise from 
the public service. Staff recruitment is not a job over which a small group 
of people may exercise a natural monopoly55 or where high barriers to 
entering the market exist. 
• the market for jobs is dynamic and changing. Arguably agencies motivated 
by profit will actively seize upon new demands for services quicker than 
an expert civil servant, who may be more suited to industries where 
people’s basic needs change less. In this way a private market can perform 
innovative functions better. Where it cannot, it will lose the competition 
to a public service. 
 
Today no prohibitions exist in economically developed countries, because properly 
regulated private employment agencies are seen as valuable players in matching 
workers to work. The quicker people find jobs, the less short-term unemployment. 
To make it work, however, proper regulation appears to be key. So what 
regulation exists today? 
 
REGULATION TODAY 
 
In the UK, as in France and Germany, the present regulatory framework evolved 
in the 1970s.56 All three countries introduced laws requiring employment agencies 
                                                     
55 A term used in economics, first by J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848) Book II, ch XIV, para 
13-4. 
56 See C. Vigneau, ‘Temporary Agency Work in France’ (2001-2) 23 Comparative Labour Law & Policy 
Journal 45;  P. Schüren, ‘Employee Leasing in Germany: The Hiring Out of an Employee as a Temporary 
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to obtain licences and prohibit upfront fees to workers.57 But a highly significant 
difference was that France and Germany specified that an employment agency 
would have the responsibility to the worker for the purpose of employment rights. 
In the UK it appears to have been presumed in the courts, but not codified in the 
Employment Agencies Act 1973.58 In 1994, licensing was scrapped from the UK 
scheme.59 The Secretary of State gained discretion to make prohibition orders 
against agencies (confusingly called ‘employment businesses’ under the Act)60 if 
regulation breaches are disclosed in court cases.61  
The relevant regulations are the Conduct of Employment Agencies and 
Businesses Regulations 2003.62 These restrict agencies for example, selling other 
services, strike breaking, sharing personal details and advertising jobs that do not 
exist.63 The 1973 Act itself prohibits upfront fees, unless one is an actor, model 
(including for clothing, hair and makeup), musician or sportsperson.64 Fees can 
also be charged by an agency to a client who offers a temporary worker a 
permanent contract.65 Breaching a regulation can mean a maximum penalty of 
£5,000, plus any civil damages.66 The task of enforcement of the regulations falls 
to the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate (EASI). In 2004 EASI had 12 
inspectors and 4 call centre staff. To illustrate the problem in this £27 billion 
industry,67 in 2004 EASI investigated 1,057 complaints and procured 8 
convictions.68 Workers received a total of £5,735 in compensation.69 That same 
year twenty-three cockle pickers, recruited by a clandestine employment agent, 
drowned in Morecambe Bay.70 The Gangmasters Licensing Authority was 
                                                                                                                                       
Worker’ (2001-2002) 23 Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal 67; B.A. Hepple and B.W. Napier, 
‘Temporary Workers and the Law’ (1978) 7 Industrial Law Journal 84, 98. 
57 In the UK, see Employment Agencies Act 1973, ss 1 and 6 (hereinafter ‘EEA’), but note CEABR 2003, 
r 26 and Sched 3; it appears that it had been an unfulfilled promise of the Atlee government in 1951 to 
implement ILO Convention No 96, Hansard HL vol 343 col 330 ff 8 June 1973, though in fact the Bill 
was introduced by Conservative backbencher Kenneth Lewis MP. 
58 eg Processed Vegetable Growers Association Limited v The Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1974] 1 CMLR 
113 at [27], per Kenneth Suenson-Taylor QC, ‘an employment agency […] with a view to gain, provides 
the services of its employees for a consideration.’  
59 Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994, s 35 and Sched 17. 
60 Confusingly, EAA 1973, s 13 defines what is commonly called an agency as an ‘employment business’, 
while an ‘employment agency’ is defined as merely a one off matching service, that maintains no further 
relation with the placed person. ‘Businesses’ are regulated more, and are the focus of this article. 
However, the UK statutory terminology is avoided because it is out of sync with common usage, the 
Directive and the ILO Conventions.  
61 EAA 1973, s 3A. 
62 SI 2003/3319. 
63 CEABR 2003, n 57 above, rr 5, 7, 27, 28. 
64 EAA 1973, n 57 above, s 6 and CEABR 2003, n 57 above, r 26 and Sched 3, as expanded by SI 
2007/3757, r 10. 
65 CEABR 2003, n 57 above, r 10. 
66 EAA 1973, n 57 above, s 5(2), Criminal Justice Act 1982, s 37 and CEABR 2003, n 57 above, r 30. 
67 The £27b figure is quoted on http://www.rec.uk.com/aboutrec (last visited 4 Oct 2009). 
68 HC Hansard col 284W 5 July 2005.  
69 HC Hansard col 1455W 23 June 2004.  
70 ‘Five Charged over Morecambe Bay Disaster’ (22 December 2004) The Guardian; See also, with 
somewhat inventive solutions, R. Wellings and J. Blundell, ‘The Morecambe Bay Cockle Pickers: Market 
Failure or Government Disaster?’ (2004) 24(3) Economic Affairs 69, 71: ‘these migrant workers came to the 
UK to escape the poverty created by socialism in China and were working under a regime of state-
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established under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. Licensing was 
reintroduced for agencies in agricultural, shellfish and packing industries.71 Then 
the Employment Act 2008 doubled the number of inspectors, and productivity at 
EASI has risen dramatically. Since individual claims concerning regulatory 
breaches are absent from the case reports, administrative enforcement seems 
important. 
Yet the overall regulatory picture appears haphazard. Firstly, it is unclear why 
two bodies, EASI and GLA, are needed for essentially the same employment 
agency industry. Given the agency industry turns over £27 billion and there are 
around 1.3 million agency workers, a combination of such government bodies and 
their expert staff doing similar work may be desirable from an efficiency 
standpoint. Secondly, it is unclear why licensing is not mandatory across the board. 
When licensing was abolished in 1994 the point does not appear to have been 
debated in Parliament. As a practical example, an agency that could provide food 
packing and food transporting services is incentivised to drop packing in order to 
avoid the 2004 Act’s licensing requirement. Potential synergies are lost. The threat 
of license revocation would make the regulations real. Inconsistent enforcement is 
unfair on law abiding agencies. Indeed, the new Directive presupposes that 
licensing is necessary for a properly functioning labour market.72 
Thirdly, there seems to be no real justification for exceptions in arts and 
sports to the prohibition on fees. Upfront fees are a barrier to jobs, can reach high 
levels without any promise of work and have attracted considerable criticism.73 
Similarly, ‘temp-to-perm’ fees between agencies and the end-user clients have a 
frustrating effect on direct employment. Agencies want such fees to boost income. 
But the corresponding cost may be prolonged over-management of workers. 
Fourthly, it would be desirable that fees that are charged by agencies to clients 
are disclosed to the parties involved. The Equality Act 2010 prohibits 
confidentiality, or ‘gagging clauses’ to increase the efficacy of equal pay rules.74 
This is a good model. Without transparency, it is difficult for workers to know that 
they are being unequally paid. Another aspect is that neither the client nor worker 
may realise that the agency takes home more than the worker herself. Many clients 
will want to know how much of their money is going to the worker, so the worker 
does not feel like an undervalued and demotivated ‘temp’. So it would be desirable 
that the contracts between each of the three parties disclose who gets what. This 
would make the Directive’s principle of equal pay function ‘on the ground’. 
                                                                                                                                       
regulated access to the cockle beds. An alternative market-orientated regime of private property rights in 
the cockle beds might have prevented the tragedy.’ 
71 GLA 2004, s 7. 
72 EU Temporary and Agency Work Directive, n 11 above, Art 4(1), (4) and Preamble, recital 18. 
73 See Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform v Adam [2008] EWHC (Admin) 772; Inside 
Out, ‘Model Agency’ BBC South West (1 Oct 2007): ‘I think it’s outrageous,’ said Jean Rogers, an expert 
on modelling. ‘No reputable agency ever charges an up front fee of any description.’ 
74 See Equality Act 2010, s 77. 
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The justifications put forward here for the Directive and better regulation 
have so far been economic ones, which work in everybody’s interest by ensuring a 
more stable, efficient and productive labour market. But if agency workers can still 
be treated differently because of their employee status, then international 
regulatory competition problems persist. On a national level, a further problem is 
that agencies may be used, not because they are more efficient overall at matching 
work to workers, but merely because they facilitate a transfer of wealth from the 
worker to the employer. If an employer (rationally or not) thinks it will save 
money by recruiting a ‘temp’ from an agency and does so because ‘employee’ 
rights (which it perceives to be costly, rationally or not) do not exist, then the 
agency is not being used because it does good work. It is merely a mechanism to 
flout rights and produces an unjustified subsidy to the agency industry. This would 
result in social waste because workers are being over-managed and private industry 
is becoming over-bureaucratised. This situation cannot be reasonably condoned. 
So why is it uncertain whether agency workers are ‘employees’? 
 
 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING PURPOSE: 
THE ‘EMPLOYEE’ ISSUE 
 
THE THIRD WAY 
 
A defining moment in the agency worker story took place when a young Mr 
Anthony Blair arrived at the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Nethermere (St Neots) 
Ltd v Gardiner.75 Blair was defending the employer against the claims of two ladies 
for unfair dismissal, after a dispute over holiday pay. Paid by the piece, Mrs 
Taverna sewed pockets onto trousers for five to seven hours a day, and had twelve 
and nine week breaks in the previous two years. Mrs Gardiner worked five hours a 
day and had four and one week gaps in work. Blair’s central submission was that 
no ‘mutuality of obligation’ existed, without which he asserted there could be no 
employment contract. The meaning he sought to advance was that ‘mutuality’ 
meant a ‘continuing relationship’, or a continuing duty to offer and accept work. 
Tudor Evans J rejected this argument, and particularly the spin that Blair had put 
on the test.76 Upholding the decision in the Court of Appeal, Stephenson LJ 
emphasised that the ‘mutuality’ in an employment relation is that the employer 
gives a wage and the employee provides her work and skill. This was, he said, the 
                                                     
75 [1983] ICR 319, decided on 12 November 1982. 
76 The original idea for ‘mutuality of obligation’ appeared with very different intentions in M. Freedland, 
The Contract of Employment (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976) 21-22, and was deployed (unsuccessfully) with its 
current meaning for the first time by counsel for the employer, Mr R. J. Walker, in Airfix Footwear Ltd v 
Cope [1978] ICR 1210, 1213. 
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‘irreducible minimum of obligation on each side to create a contract of service.’77 
It was the same as ‘consideration’. 
However between Blair’s Employment Appeal Tribunal submissions and 
Stephenson LJ’s affirmation that they were misplaced were two critical cases. The 
first case was Wickens v Champion Employment.78 Miss Wickens claimed she was 
dismissed unfairly. Her job was managing the agency’s workers. Reflective of 
contemporary thinking, the agency workers were expressly ‘employed under a 
contract of service with Champion Employment’. This mattered for Miss Wickens 
because at the time, unfair dismissal claims against businesses with fewer than 20 
employees were unavailable.79 To have standing, the agency workers needed to 
count. But Nolan J held agency workers were not employees because the agency’s 
control was minimal, the contract embodied no obligation to find work for those 
registered and there was a lack of ‘continuity, and care of the employer for the 
employee, that one associates with a contract of service’.80 This decision was 
without precedent and contrary to understandings about agency status since the 
Employment Agencies Act 1973.81 The second case was O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte 
plc.82 Trusthouse Forte plc traded as Grosvenor House Hotel on Park Lane. It did 
regular banqueting events at irregular times. Mr O’Kelly, a wine butler, joined the 
Hotel and Catering Workers Union with other waiters. He was told he was no 
longer needed. The tribunal held the waiters were not ‘employees’ for the purpose 
of legislation that protected the right to organise. The Employment Appeal 
Tribunal, chaired by Browne-Wilkinson J, reversed this over the submissions of 
Alexander Irvine QC for the employers. The EAT held a series of contracts of 
employment existed, so the right to join a union applied. On further appeal, Irvine 
QC’s argument’s crux was that the waiters were ‘casual workers’ under the Wages 
Council Order (R6) definition that ‘a worker who undertakes engagements on 
either an hourly or day-to-day basis and has the right to choose, without penalty, 
whether or not to come to work’.83 
With this lack of ‘mutuality of obligation’, Irvine QC insisted that a ‘casual 
worker’ was the same as an independent contractor.84 For the waiters, Stephen 
Sedley QC argued that ‘mutuality of obligation’ could not be a decisive factor in 
characterising the relationship, and even if it was, in this case the real sanction for 
not accepting work was to not be called again. But the Court of Appeal accepted 
Irvine QC’s arguments and restored the tribunal’s decision. When there was no 
                                                     
77 [1984] ICR 612, 623, decided on 3 May 1984. 
78 [1984] ICR 365, decided 5 October 1983. 
79 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1980, s 64A. 
80 [1984] ICR 365, 371. 
81 eg Processed Vegetable Growers Association Limited v The Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1974] 1 CMLR 
113 at [27], per Kenneth Suenson-Taylor QC, ‘an employment agency […] with a view to gain, provides 
the services of its employees for a consideration.’ 
82 [1984] QB 90 decided on 20 July 1983. 
83 ibid, 96. 
84 ibid, 96. 
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formal obligation to offer work or turn up for it, there was no ‘continuing 
relationship’. This lack of ‘mutuality’ precluded an employment contract.85 It was a 
contract for something else, but not an employment contract. 
So from the 1980s there was a new judicial willingness to put casual workers 
outside employment protection, and agency workers were out first. Even though 
the Court of Appeal had said two different things in Nethermere and O’Kelly, the 
affirmation of the ‘continuing relationship’ type mutuality in O’Kelly entrenched 
the message of Wickens.86 An employer has been able to rely on an agency as a 
kind of ‘badge of non-enforceability’ of employment rights. And with O’Kelly 
mutuality in place, the agency industry boomed. In the five years before O’Kelly, 
the number of agencies grew 17 per cent, and in the five years after O’Kelly the 
number of agencies grew 231 per cent. The numbers of agencies went from 5,057 
in 1977 to an estimated 17,000 agencies in 2008.87 The industry consumed around 
£3 billion a year in 1993. Now it is £27 billion. It appears that, at least partly, the 
gap in employment rights has served as an unjustified subsidy for the employment 
agency industry. 
After the 1997 election, reinstatement of employment protection was 
unlikely. Blair’s views appeared to be what he had argued for in Nethermere. In 1996 
he told the Confederation of German Industry in Bonn, 
 
No new rights for workers […] we will not be bullied by Brussels [into] 
automatically accepting Continental style employment policies.88 
 
Moreover, Irvine QC had become Lord Irvine LC. In Carmichael v National Power 
plc,89 a number of tour guides had requested a written statement of their contracts. 
They worked four to eighteen hours a week. Lord Irvine LC held that the guides 
were not ‘employees’, except perhaps during work hours.90 Lord Irvine LC said 
that the continuing obligation to provide work was the meaning of mutuality of 
                                                     
85 ibid, 115-116, 124-125. 
86 It is worth noting what a courageous precedent O’Kelly purported to set: you can be sacked for 
organising a union. It was partially reflected in TULRCA 1992, n 4 above, s 142 which provides that an 
employer may not subject a ‘worker’ to any detriment for union activity. But the provisions protecting 
against dismissal (paradoxically) apply merely to an ‘employee’. After Wilson and Palmer v United Kingdom 
[2002] IRLR 568, the government did not amend the law fully when it introduced the Employment 
Rights Act 2004 to comply, see K.D. Ewing, ‘The Implications of Wilson and Palmer’ (2003) 32 ILJ 1. 
However it is plain that dismissal for union organising would be automatically unfair due to the common 
law and if not ECHR, Art 11, and the duty of rights compliant interpretation under the Human Rights 
Act 1998, s 3; cf S. Deakin and G. Morris, Labour Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 5th ed, 2009) 713.  
87 HC Written Answers col 74 Mr Michael Forsyth 7 February 1994; Note the 17,000 figure comes from 
the Recruitment and Employment Confederation membership (which is declining) and is probably 
understated. In addition, there are 1,159 licenses issued under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. 
This, however, is not a complete guide, because it does not include agencies sending workers from 
abroad. See also, A. Gray, ‘Jobseekers and Gatekeepers: The Role of Private Employment Agencies in the 
Placement of the Unemployed’ (2002) 16(4) Work, Employment and Society 655, 659 
88 See J. Sherman, ‘Labour changes policy stance on workers’ right’ (19 June 1996) The Times; also C Hay, 
The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring Under False Pretences? (Manchester University Press 1999) ch 4 
89 [1999] 1 WLR 2042. 
90 ibid, 2047. 
                07/2010 
 
 16
obligation. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who had rejected Irvine’s submissions at the 
EAT stage of O’Kelly, agreed with his ‘noble and learned friend on the Woolsack’. 
So did Lord Goff and Lord Jauncey. Only Lord Hoffmann delivered a considered 
opinion, but concentrated on the distinction between fact and law in contractual 
interpretation. He explained the old division of competence between juries and 
judges and agreed with the Lord Chancellor’s decision. Curiously, however, Lord 
Irvine LC relied on Stephenson LJ in Nethermere for his definition of mutuality. It 
has already been noted that Stephenson LJ’s definition of mutuality was the same 
as consideration and this explicitly contradicts the Blair/Irvine view. It would 
therefore seem that ‘mutuality of obligation’ as a matter of authority has the same 
meaning as given by Stephenson LJ. Therefore as a matter of authority there is 
arguably no continuing work requirement. It would seem this is not a barrier to 
employment contracts existing. However this was not the lesson followed. 
Although some courts persevered in stating that no one test is conclusive,91 in 
reality ‘mutuality of obligation’ became the key test. In Montgomery v Johnson 
Underwood Ltd,92 for example, this is plain. Mrs Montgomery, after two and a half 
years as a receptionist at Orenstein & Kopple through the Johnson Underwood 
agency, was dismissed for making personal phone calls. Buckley J in the Court of 
Appeal held that the ‘irreducible minimum’ legal requirement of mutuality of 
obligation was absent as against Orenstein & Kopple. The court chose to treat the 
case as one of standing, even though Mrs Montgomery’s claim may in any event 
have been doubtful, and even though Buckley J recognised that agency workers 
were to be left in legal limbo. Agency workers had no right to be heard because 
they were not ‘employees’, because there is no ‘mutuality of obligation’. 
But is ‘mutuality of obligation’ an intellectually coherent concept? Let us 
focus on the right to reasonable notice under ERA 1996 section 86. This right 
benefits working people who are unable to negotiate it in their contracts for 
themselves. It benefits those with unequal bargaining power.93 You must, says 
section 86, be given a week’s notice after one month, two week’s notice after two 
years, and so forth up to twelve weeks after twelve years. Lack of mutuality, says 
the O’Kelly approach, means no obligation to accept work when it is offered or 
provide notice before severing the relationship. So it is precisely an obligation like 
notice before dismissal that is a pre-requisite for the same employment right. In 
order to have a right to reasonable notice (section 86) you must be an employee 
(section 230). An employee must have a contract of employment (section 230(1)). 
A contract of employment means a contract of service (section 230(1)). A contract 
of service cannot exist without the ‘irreducible minimum’ of mutuality of 
obligation. And mutuality of obligation means, apparently, you must have 
                                                     
91 eg Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bottrill [1999] ICR 592, 603. 
92 [2001] IRLR 269, 275; nb both the Tribunal and the EAT held, unlike Wickens that the agency was the 
employer. 
93 Someone has greater ‘bargaining power’ when they have wider range of good alternatives than a 
bargaining partner, consistent with the definition in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Sched 2(a). 
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negotiated a term restricting the termination of a contract, such as reasonable 
notice. The logical equation of O’Kelly, Carmichael and Montgomery is this: 
 
rights beyond the contract = ‘employee’ = contract of employment = 
contract of service = mutuality of obligation = rights beyond the contract in 
the contract. 
 
It is circular reasoning at its best. To get employment rights you need to have 
negotiated them already, even though those rights exist precisely because you are 
not in a position to negotiate for them. Employment rights are on an intellectual 
merry-go-round. It is more clever, but no better, than saying, ‘you don’t have 
statutory rights because your employer didn’t want them.’ 
 
THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH 
 
The present approach to the scope of employment protection is legally defective 
and logically indefensible. It is also chronically doubtful when measured against 
the purpose of employment legislation. In Byrne Brothers (Formwork) Ltd v Baird, 
Underhill QC explained that purpose.94 ‘The reason,’ he said, ‘why employees are 
thought to need such protection is that they are in a subordinate and dependent 
position vis-à-vis their employers.’ 95 Mr Baird was a builder, doing work on a 
standard form sub contractor agreement. He claimed against Byrne Brothers that 
he was entitled to holiday pay over Christmas under the Working Time 
Regulations 1998,96 whose scope uses the concept of a ‘worker’. This means 
anyone with a contract of employment or someone who personally performs work 
and is not a professional client or customer.97 Underhill QC said that the same 
rationale for giving employment protection to ‘employees’ went for ‘workers’, so 
despite a limited contractual right to find a substitute worker when he was ill, a 
dependant worker such as Mr Baird fell within the Regulations. 
In Redrow Homes (Yorkshire) Ltd v Wright,98 Pill LJ qualified Underhill QC’s 
approach. In a joined appeal involving bricklayers claiming to be within the scope 
of the Working Time Regulations 1998, Pill LJ said that tribunals should not be 
deflected from construing the term ‘worker’ and a contract ‘by general policy 
considerations’. He warned against saying, ‘that, because the applicants ought to 
come within definition of worker, it follows that they do […] Expressions such as 
                                                     
94 See also, Vernon v Bethell (1762) 28 ER 838; A Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776) Book I, ch 2; S. Webb 
and B. Webb, Industrial Democracy (Longmans, 1897) Part III, ch 2; France v James Coombes & Co [1929] AC 
496, 505-6; O. Kahn Freund,  Labour and the Law: The Hamlyn Lectures (London: Stevens & Sons, 1972) 4; 
in the United States, see National Labor Relations Act of 1935, s1 and National Labor Relations Board v 
Hearst Publications, Inc, 322 US 111 (1944). 
95 [2002] ICR 667, 677. 
96 Working Time Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1833 (hereinafter ‘WTR 1998’). 
97 ibid, r 2(1). 
98 [2004] EWCA Civ 469; [2004] 3 All ER 98. 
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“degree of dependence” […] assist little in that task.’99 Instead, Pill LJ urged that 
the first task was one of construction, to assess whether the bricklayers did in fact 
personally perform work, and in this instance they did. But Pill LJ could not have 
meant that the policy context was entirely irrelevant in assessing the contract’s 
form, any more than the business context is irrelevant in assessing the words of a 
contract.100 Indeed, the only reason for which the exercise of construction is 
undertaken is to find whether employment protection measures would apply.101 
To disregard the reason behind the legislation would run the risk of defeating the 
purpose of the task itself. Put in this sense, it is precisely because certain groups of 
workers ought to come within statutory definitions that they do.102 In Heydon’s case 
Coke CJ stated, 
 
the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall 
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle 
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato 
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the 
true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.103 
 
A strong analogy for how to approach the term ‘employee’ can be drawn from the 
leading insolvency case, Re Spectrum Plus Ltd,104 where Natwest Bank plc gave 
Spectrum Plus Ltd credit and contracted in return for a ‘specific charge’ over 
Spectrum Plus Ltd’s book debts. Like ‘employee’ under the ERA 1996, the term 
‘floating charge’ is largely undefined in the Insolvency Act 1986. If a charge is 
‘specific’ or ‘fixed’, then when a company is insolvent, that creditor may take the 
assets subject to the fixed charge without sharing them with other unpaid 
creditors. But if the charge is ‘floating’, employees, their pension funds, unsecured 
creditors (up to certain limits) and insolvency practitioners must be paid first.105 
The archetypal case of an asset subject to a fixed charge is a house, or the 
company van, while at the other end of the ‘spectrum’ are assets traded from time 
to time by the company, such as crates of paint delivered on Monday and sold 
through the week. Because a floating charge can really apply to anything, late 
nineteenth century legislation mandated that certain vulnerable creditors would get 
                                                     
99 [2004] EWCA Civ 469 at [21]-[22]. 
100 See Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR; Attorney General of 
Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 11. 
101 This is particularly true where the EU is concerned and teleological interpretation is mandatory, Case 
106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135 at [8]. 
102 Cf D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) Book III, part I, s I, saying rightly that one should 
clearly be more wary of - in the other direction - stating that one may derive what one ought to do from 
what is the case; cf M. Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (1957) Part I. 
103 (1584) 76 ER 637. 
104 [2005] UKHL 41. 
105 IA 1986 ss 175, 176A, s 176ZA, Sched 6.  
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preference over floating charge holders.106 This means the totality of a company’s 
assets, future paint and all, cannot be swept up by a single lender who had the 
bargaining power to contract for security, leaving nothing for those without 
bargaining power. Lenders want fixed charges to avoid statutory subordination in 
the creditor queue. The question is how a charge should be defined. Between the 
house and the paint cans lies a range of assets that can be subject to more or fewer 
contractual restrictions. There is no clear demarcation. In this situation the House 
of Lords held that the charges in question on the book debts were floating, 
because though it was described as a ‘specific charge’ in the contract and funds 
were kept in a separate bank account, the company routinely drew on the funds. 
In reaching this conclusion, Lord Scott said,107 
 
recognition that this is the essential characteristic of a floating charge [ie 
assets are not finally appropriated by the creditor until a future event] reflects 
the mischief that the statutory intervention to which I have referred was 
intended to meet and should ensure that preferential creditors continue to 
enjoy the priority that section 175 of the 1986 Act and its statutory 
predecessors intended them to have. 
 
Here we have a term, ‘floating charge’, which like the term ‘employee’ is undefined 
in statute. Like the term ‘employee’, there is no single characteristic of a floating 
charge, but an essential idea which is used for the purpose of protective legislation. 
And like the term ‘employee’, a floating charge can only be distinguished from its 
opposite through purposive reasoning. The purpose of the exercise must be clear 
before a meaning can be found. 
There are glimmers of a purposive approach in cases interpreting ‘employee’. 
They need to be highlighted more. In Buchan and Ivey v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry,108 Mummery J held that two directors who owned all the shares of a 
company that had gone insolvent could not claim compensation from the 
National Insurance Fund.109 Interpreting the term ‘employee’, Mummery J said,110 
 
The context in which the issue of employee or non-employee arises under the 
1978 Act is protection of employment. More particularly, the purpose […] is 
to provide for state funded compensation to be available for employees 
employed by those whose businesses have failed financially. It is not the 
purpose of those provisions to provide compensation to an individual 
businessman or entrepreneur whose own incorporated business ventures 
have been unsuccessful. 
                                                     
106 See Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, 53; Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy 
Amendment Act 1897, s 2. 
107 [2005] UKHL 41 at [111]. 
108 [1997] BCC 145. 
109 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 ss 106 and 122, now ERA 1996, n 3 above, ss 182-
190. 
110 Buchan and Ivey v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, n 108 above, 153-154. 
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While the decision and its purposive approach was, with respect, clearly correct on 
the facts, subsequently in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bottrill,111 Lord 
Woolf MR qualified the decision insofar as Mummery J suggested that being a sole 
shareholder would act as an absolute bar to being classified as an employee. So 
where Mr Bottrill was the managing director of the insolvent Magnatech UK Ltd, 
the fact that he was the only shareholder did not preclude his claim for unpaid 
wages (£346.15 a week) from the National Insurance Fund.112 Mr Bottrill’s sole 
shareholding was merely a temporary measure before the American Magnatech 
Group would take over ownership. The purpose of the legislation in both cases 
was given full effect. 
The purposive approach to interpretation is firmly rooted in English law, and 
the goal is the same whether interpreting a contract, a company’s articles or 
legislation.113 Ambiguities in legislation may be resolved by referring to Hansard.114 
In our search for meaning it would seem that the most relevant point is when the 
word ‘employee’ was introduced in the Contracts of Employment Act 1963. This 
was the first modern employment law statute.115 It introduced the right to a 
written statement of one’s contract and reasonable notice before dismissal, after 
five weeks of employment. Its mechanism of using the ‘employee’ concept has 
been transferred from Act to Act up to today. The Minister for Labour who 
introduced the Bill on the second reading was the Conservative, John Hare MP. 
The reason for the 1963 Act was this. 
 
The Bill is a part of the Government’s plans to provide greater security for 
workers. This is a time when industry must be quick to adopt improved 
methods and exploit new techniques if we are to expand our production and 
maintain our competitive position […] fear of change and what it can mean is 
a powerful incentive to resist change and slow it down by all possible means. 
But if we reduce that fear and give proper consideration and effective help, 
we can help, I think, to create an atmosphere in which the need for change is 
accepted and there is co-operation in creating an efficient and flexible 
economy […] The only way to secure the advance that is needed for everyone 
is to lay down minimum standards, as we are doing in the Bill. But I repeat 
that these are minimum standards. The object of the Bill is not only to bring 
everybody up to the minimum but also to encourage employers to improve 
on the minimum on a voluntary basis.116 
 
                                                     
111 [1999] ICR 592. 
112 ERA 1996, n 3 above, ss 166 and 182.  
113 Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 11; [2009] 1 WLR 1988. 
114 Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL 3; [1993] AC 593, 617; Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 
38; [2009] 1 AC 1101. 
115 See S. Deakin and G. Morris, Labour Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 5th ed, 2009) 228. 
116 Hansard HC vol 671 cols 1503-1505 14 February 1963. 
  
Ewan McGaughey                                        Should Agency Workers be Treated Differently?  
 
 21
When looking back at Hansard, one cannot simply cherry pick any backbench 
quip, but may use as strong evidence of Parliamentary intention a clear and 
unambiguous ministerial statement.117 The extract makes plain that the 
Government did not draw distinctions between ‘employee’ and ‘worker’ to leave 
out a vulnerable tier of people. It is clear that the purpose of the legislation, which 
used the word ‘employee’, was to provide security for workers. But it also vividly 
illustrates that the Government rejected the notion that a worker’s security 
reduced employers’ flexibility. Fostering a climate of mutual trust and confidence 
is seen as the key to productive, economic efficiency. These were the social 
considerations which gave rise to the legislation.118 As a matter of statutory 
purpose, it can confidently be said that employment rights were designed to cover 
everyone from the vulnerable up to the truly autonomous, not leaving out agency 
workers. About the fact that the ERA 1996 ought to and does cover agency 
workers, there are no two ways, let alone a third way. 
 
IS THERE A WAY FORTH? 
 
Sadly, over the past two decades, as the basic purpose of employee rights has been 
undermined, labour lawyers appear to have fallen into despair with the courts.119 
One solution is Parliament re-legislating.120 As suggested above, when the new 
Directive is due to come in force it would be the ideal time explicitly to close the 
loophole and state that agency workers are employees. There is no sign of this yet 
under the Agency Workers Regulations 2010,121 but it may be required, since 
article 2 of the Directive designates agencies as employers, and article 3(1)(c) says a 
‘temporary agency worker’ is ‘a worker with a contract of employment or an 
employment relationship’. Going further, clearly a comprehensive statute to 
classify contracts of employment would solve the problem. Or under the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 section 23, the Secretary of State has the power 
to explicitly include categories of people within the definition of ‘employee’. Lord 
Wedderburn of Charlton advocated moves on this in debates leading up to the 
Employment Act 2008.122 But nothing happened. Calls for re-legislation may 
overlook the issue. More legislation could be passed, but there is little difficulty to 
find new ways to undermine it. Parliament did not create the problem. The Court 
of Appeal created the problem in O’Kelly. The problems of agency workers show 
that both legislation (for equal working time and pay) and purposive judicial 
reasoning (to maintain employment rights coverage) are needed. There are 
                                                     
117 Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2003] UKHL 40 at [58]. 
118 cf Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher [1949] 2 KB 481, 498-499. 
119 See A.C.L. Davies, ‘The Contract for Intermittent Employment’ (2007) 36(1) ILJ 102, ‘Although many 
labour lawyers have turned to legislative reform proposals in despair at judicial attitudes towards casual 
workers, it is important not to neglect the potential of the courts as a source of reform.’ 
120 A suggestion made in Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 318 at [42]-[43] and James 
v Greenwich LBC [2008] EWCA Civ 35 at [58]. 
121 See The Agency Workers Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/93). The deadline to implement the Directive, n 
11 above, Art 11, is 5 December 2011. 
122 Hansard HL col GC81 25 February 2008.  
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excellent reasons to be optimistic. The common law cannot exist without reason, 
and experience is showing the damage of the ‘mutuality’ defect.123 The only pre-
condition to the problem’s correction is its recognition. 
But then it could be argued that if the courts created problems in the past, the 
courts should not be counted on to take a purposive approach to employment 
rights in future.124 True it may be that from time to time a few metaphorical 
crooked cords get the better of the golden metwand.125 But nobody would argue 
that courts should take a stance that actively undermines the purpose of 
employment rights. Intentionally or not, this has happened. The status of a 
receptionist of two and a half years in Montgomery is not open to ambiguity. Even 
in absence of legislation, common law should develop consistently with social 
principles.126  
Additionally it could be argued that it is ‘too late’ for the common law to 
amend its confusion. Employment agencies have thrived, so an argument could 
go, because of the expectation that agency status carries with it a badge of non-
enforceability for employment rights. For the courts to perform a u-turn now 
would defeat the legitimate expectations of thousands of employment agencies. 
Particularly at a time of economic instability, the courts have no place in making 
socio-economic policy decisions. But arguably the better view is to consider the 
same questions as did the House of Lords in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd, which is whether 
changes would give effect to claimants’ statutory rights.127 
The way forth would seem to be, first, recognition that employment rights 
remedy inequality of bargaining power, protecting the economically dependent, 
who are unable contract for minimum employment rights. Like the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 does for consumers or the Companies Act 2006 does 
for shareholders, mandatory terms in the ERA 1996 articulate a meaningful 
conception of that to which employees would truly consent. Employment rights 
change the internal mechanism of the market place, so that all people can 
participate at work on a decent footing. This is not a social cost, but an economic 
investment which boosts productivity and the incentive of people to contribute 
more to their workplaces. 
Second, it follows that the core feature of an employment contract, beyond 
the irreducible minimum feature of work for a wage, is a relation of economic 
dependency. The word ‘employee’ means nothing much in itself, but is important 
                                                     
123 To paraphrase E. Coke, Commentary Upon Littleton (1628) 97b and O.E. Holmes, The Common Law 
(1881) 1. 
124 H. Collins, ‘Independent Contracts and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment 
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332. 
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as a linguistic vehicle to carry mandatory rules.128 Economic dependence must be 
the essential feature because employment legislation makes no sense unless it 
protects those who, despite the virtue of contractual freedom, do not acquire truly 
decent terms. Though some would argue this is an unworkable definition, the 
argument is false because it works in multiple jurisdictions.129 It is the core feature 
of the ‘worker’ concept used by European Court of Justice.130 It should be 
apparent that the concept of a UK ‘worker’ goes even further than that in the EU, 
protecting an even more autonomous category of people, because it operates 
through the defined exclusion of ‘clients’ and ‘customers’. The UK ‘employee’ is 
the same as the EU ‘worker’. 
Third, it may be reaffirmed that various other indicia, such as degrees of 
‘control’, one’s ‘badge of organisation’, ‘integration’ or ‘personal performance of 
work’ may fill out the essential feature of employment. One could add other tests. 
For instance, employment status should follow wherever the term of mutual trust 
and confidence, or a ‘master-servant’ relation would be construed.131 One could, in 
analogy with consumer law,132 draw a heavy presumption of employment status if 
work is performed personally under a standard form contract. The best way to 
interpret the idea of ‘employee’ is to have firmly in mind the purpose behind the 
exercise, to protect the relatively vulnerable. Until the United Kingdom regresses 
to a total doctrine of at-will employment, the coverage of employment rights must 
be completed. 
There is, however, an outstanding issue. It is not only the word ‘employee’ 
that gives rise to problems. Because how can you have employment rights if there 
is no employer? 
 
 
 
GOING ROUND IN TRIANGLES: THE ‘EMPLOYER’ ISSUE 
 
TRIANGULATION 
 
It was noted above that the new Directive designates employment agencies as the 
employers.133 But somehow the English cases arrived at the conclusion that many 
agency workers are without any employer who owes employees duties. Presently 
denying agency workers employment rights is a theory of implied terms, which 
starts with a description of agency work as a ‘triangular relationship’. This 
                                                     
128 cf Denham v Midland Employers’ Mutual Assurance Ltd [1955] 2 QB 437, 444. 
129 See, eg, A. Freckmann, ‘The Employee Under German Law’ (2002) 13(9) International Company and 
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geometrical engagement has become very prevalent.134 It is intended to highlight 
differences in the obligations of the client, agency and worker. In Germany the 
concept is used to specify who is responsible for statutory rights. Peter Schüren 
writes the leading commentary on the Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz (Employee 
Leasing Act). He describes the German position like this: 
 
All forms of employee leasing are conducted as a three party contract, in 
which the lessor, the lessee, and the “leased person” are involved. The basis is 
the employee leasing contract: the lessors commit themselves to provide the 
lessee with a suitable “leased employee,” without the lessee becoming the 
leased employee’s employer. The lessor remains the employer of the leased 
employee, even during the leasing period. The legal bond between the lessor 
and the lessee is not a contract of employment. It is a contract under civil 
law.135 
 
German employment agencies are explicitly responsible for giving reasonable 
notice before fair dismissal and any redundancy. But in the UK, there has been an 
element of triangulation over responsibility. In Dacas v Brook Street Bureau (UK) 
Ltd,136 the Court of Appeal thought an employment contract would exist between 
an agency worker and the client after ‘considering all the evidence’. But in James v 
Greenwich LBC,137 the Court of Appeal said the only contract is with the agency, 
not a client, because ‘implying a contract’ with the client is not ‘necessary’. Mrs 
Dacas had worked for Wandsworth LBC (through Brook Street) for four years. 
She was dismissed for apparent rudeness. Mrs James had worked for Greenwich 
LBC (through a Brook Street subsidiary) for three years. She was dismissed after 
she apparently took sick leave without informing the agency or client. Neither Mrs 
Dacas nor Mrs James could bring a claim against both employers. And each case 
reached differing conclusions or perhaps no conclusion at all.138 On the ground, 
triangulating about the ‘employer’ issue means that agency workers continue to 
live in legal limbo. An essential precondition to claiming a right is knowledge of 
what it is. But now, even if agency workers are visible under the scope of 
employment protection, their rights are illusory. 
The implications of James are particularly grim. The Court of Appeal in 
Muschett v HM Prison Service has held that an agency worker had no standing for a 
                                                     
134 eg M. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2003) 43-45; Dacas v Brook 
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claim (among other things) for racial discrimination.139 Rimer LJ felt bound by 
James to say it was not ‘necessary’ to imply a contract with a client, and therefore 
there was no employment contract on which equality legislation could ride. With 
respect, the Court of Appeal’s oversight of the purpose of the Race Relations Act 
1975,140 precedent,141 and its non-derogable duty to give effect to the EU Race 
Equality Directive,142 which is explicit in comprehensive coverage, will be short 
lived because the Equality Act 2010 makes the position entirely clear.143 But 
unintentionally, the reasoning in James may be encouraging a culture where you can 
be sacked for having differently coloured skin, so long as you are an agency 
worker with differently coloured skin. This loophole is arguably even worse than 
undermining the right to join a union in O’Kelly or the right to job security in 
Montgomery. Unintentionally, the law on agency workers is attempting to unravel 
not just collective bargaining, not just the welfare state, but also the civil rights 
movement. 
 
WORK FOR A WAGE 
 
The triangular description of agency work should not be allowed to obscure what 
is an essentially bilateral contract, a wage from the client for work from the 
worker. An agency is just the middleman,144 but a middleman that nevertheless 
habitually exercises the same power to dismiss,145 bargain over pay, require a dress 
code, demand submission of time sheets,146 or require workers to regularly ‘touch 
base’ on how things are. On any test for ‘employee’ status (apart from ‘mutuality 
of obligation’) it should be clear that every typical employment agency really 
exercises the same functions as a typical employer. An agency is no different from 
a layer of middle management in a large firm, whose failure to abide by a 
mandatory term of an employment contract would impute vicarious responsibility 
to the legal employer. By contrast, an atypical agency might be one which has 
teachers on its books for private tuition with school or university students at their 
homes. Here the relation of economic dependency (a teacher with more expertise 
and a more valuable range of options, not in such poor work) would clearly point 
to self-employment against both the pupil and the agency. This is far removed from 
the situations of Mrs Montgomery, Mrs Dacas or Mrs James. 
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Why has the principle of joint and several responsibility not been applied to 
the client and agency, treating both as employers? Until recently the case of 
Laugher v Pointer147 may have been a bar. A coach driver, hired out to a carriage 
business, was held to not be the employee of both the carriage business and 
hirer.148 This was probably a policy decision to prevent a multiplicity of actions in 
the early 19th century, and it was overturned in Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal 
Transfer (Northern) Ltd.149 Young Darren had clambered through a duct on 
Viasystems’ building site. The duct broke, hit a sprinkler and caused a flood. 
Darren was there to work with his mate, who was contracted by CAT Metalwork 
Services, which was contracted by S&P Darwell Ltd, which was contracted by 
Thermal to fix Viasystems’ air conditioning (that is, six parties). May LJ held that 
CAT and S&P were the employers and were jointly and severally liable in equal 
proportion under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 section 2. Striking a 
note of caution in the development of this new principle May LJ added, obiter, that, 
 
if the relevant relationships yield dual control it is highly likely at least that the 
measure of control will be equal. An equal measure of control will not often 
arise. Dual vicarious liability is most unlikely to be a possibility if one of the 
candidates for such liability is also personally at fault. It would be entirely 
redundant if both were.150 
 
This may have been an unnecessary qualification. In developing the law, plainly 
there is always legitimate concern that change may have unforeseeable effects. 
However, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 is flexible enough to 
accommodate an unequal apportionment of liability, with regard to the fault of 
either party.151 Also there could well be more than two employers. For example, 
when James was being litigated, Greenwich LBC had reached the point where it 
had around 700 workers from over a hundred different employment agencies out 
of a total of around 6,000 council employees (11 per cent of the workforce). So in 
June 2007 it hired an employment agency (Manpower) to manage the employment 
agencies. If one employer is personally at fault, multiple liability is not necessarily 
redundant, because that employer may have gone insolvent. As against a worker 
who has received no notice before an unfair dismissal, and can in no way be said 
to herself be at fault, joint and several liability is necessary to give effect to the 
reasonable expectation that employment legislation will not be defeated. 
After Viasystems it should have appeared entirely open for an agency worker 
to seek compensation for breach of contract from either her agency or the client, 
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and for agency and client to seek contribution from the other. It has been 
suggested that tort liability and employment rights embody different policies,152 so 
a definition of ‘employee’ in one area cannot be exported to another. But in all 
cases the best justification for mandatory rights is that they create results that one 
party – whether tort victim or employee – would be unable to have bargained 
for.153 It would probably be preferable that the agency be held liable as the chief 
employer where there was a failure to give reasonable notice or redundancy. An 
agency is the chief employer under UK tax laws, in continental jurisdictions, under 
the new Directive,154 and holds itself out as having the special skill for staffing 
matters. In unfair dismissal cases, however, primary responsibility would 
preferably lie with those privy to the misconduct. If the misconducting party had 
gone insolvent, it is fair that the less responsible other is jointly and severally liable 
as an employer, because clients and agencies freely choose to contract a 
substantially less free worker into that arrangement. This logical solution still 
hangs on the verge of being adopted, because the existence of any employment 
contract is being denied. We shall now look at three arguments for denial. 
 
DENYING ANY CONTRACT 
 
Building by order of complexity, let us first consider the situation, as arose on the 
facts in James,155 where a written agreement expressly characterises itself as ‘a 
contract for services’, or not one of employment. Clearly the agency or client’s 
formulation is not definitive of the substance of the arrangement, especially where 
it is simply an attempt to avoid employment rights.156 
Second, what about the situation where a written agreement between worker 
and agency (or the client) contains a long clause effectively saying, “this is not a 
legally enforceable contract”? This could be a way for a client to avoid any 
employment related responsibility. But could it differ from a term saying, “you 
agree you get no notice or redundancy in any circumstance”? It would seem that 
the relevant rule is whether there is an ‘intention to create legal relations’. This rule 
is inappropriately worded, because the real policy is that courts presume people 
want to enforce agreements in the commercial sphere, but not in the domestic 
sphere.157 Presumptions are rebuttable, so commercial parties may manifest true 
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consent to not be bound. In Rose & Frank Co Ltd v JR Crompton Bros, Rose & 
Frank had agreed to distribute JR Crompton Bros’ carbon paper in America. They 
expressly said that the agreement ‘shall not be subject to legal jurisdiction in the 
Law Courts’. Their relationship broke down. JR Crompton Bros refused to 
continue the agreement and Rose & Frank tried to sue. In the Court of Appeal 
Atkin LJ said,  
 
I have never seen such a clause before, but I see nothing necessarily absurd in 
business men seeking to regulate their business relations by mutual promises 
which fall short of legal obligations, and rest on obligations of either honour 
or self-interest, or perhaps both.158 
 
Atkin LJ’s decision was endorsed by the House of Lords,159 and it should be clear 
that his emphasis on how ‘business men’ in ‘business relations’ might structure 
their affairs means the ability to contract out of contract enforcement would be 
possible only if both parties contract on equal footing. The right to seek the 
protection of the courts is a right which cannot be given up, as a matter of public 
policy, unless the parties can clearly protect themselves.160 Workers cannot 
because they do not have equal bargaining power. 
Third, let us suppose that some form of written agreement existed with an 
agency but not the client (or vice versa). And let us further suppose that the 
agency is now insolvent, or the worker has not been advised to sue both, again as 
in James. This is what Mummery LJ tentatively viewed the current law to be: 
 
In many cases agency workers will fall outside the scope of the protection of 
the 1996 Act because neither the workers nor the end users were in any kind 
of express contractual relationship with each other and it is not necessary to 
imply one in order to explain the work undertaken by the worker for the end 
user.161 
 
It is not entirely clear why Mrs James, having worked with Greenwich for three 
years, did not have a contract through conduct.162 No form is required for the 
conclusion of an employment contract.163 If I get on a London Routemaster, sit 
down and give the bus conductor a pound, without discussing what we are doing, 
there is an obvious offer as the bus door is open, and an obvious acceptance when 
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I get on, with a clear mutual exchange of consideration. Now let us suppose that 
the bus conductor was the employee of Conductors Ltd, a recently outsourced 
firm separate from Transport for London. And suppose that TfL’s contract with 
Conductors Ltd expressly denied that Conductors Ltd had the authority to form 
any contract, particularly a consumer contract, on its behalf with passengers. The 
driver, who is TfL’s employee, crashes. Conductors Ltd has gone insolvent. Can I 
claim a refund from TfL? Surely there was a contract, and TfL breached its 
statutory duty of care and skill. An exclusion clause between TfL and Conductors 
Ltd could not have the effect of denying a contractual obligation to me, because it 
would be a variety of an unreasonable exemption clause under the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 section 13. In what sense was it any different for Mrs James? She 
came to work. The council gave her work. She was paid. A contract therefore 
arises.  
The reasoning in James was that ‘implying a contract’ (ie recognising a contract 
formed) was impossible unless a ‘necessity’ test is fulfilled. Mummery LJ relied on 
The Aramis where Bingham LJ stated, 
 
whether a contract is to be implied is a question of fact and that a contract 
will only be implied where it is necessary to do so […] it would, in my view, 
be contrary to principle to countenance the implication of a contract from 
conduct if the conduct relied upon is no more consistent with an intention to 
contract than with an intention not to contract. It must, surely, be necessary 
to identify conduct referable to the contract contended for or, at the very 
least, conduct inconsistent with there being no contract made between the 
parties. Put another way, I think it must be fatal to the implication of a 
contract if the parties would or might have acted exactly as they did in the 
absence of a contract.164 
 
Firstly, it is important to assess this statement together with Bingham LJ’s opinion 
in Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd v Blackpool BC,165 when he revisited the same 
question. Here he expressly referred to the ‘confident assumptions of commercial 
men’ while saying that one should ‘be able to conclude with confidence both that 
the parties intended to create contractual relations and that the agreement was to 
the effect contended for’.166 Like in Rose & Frank, the emphasis on what 
‘commercial men’ did ‘intend’ suggests a set of cases wholly inapplicable to the 
context of employment. Business and commerce are not the same, because an 
employment relationship is one characterised by inequality of bargaining power. 
Secondly, it is important to consider the other implied contract cases. In Baird 
Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc167 a supplier of thirty years to M&S was 
dropped without any notice. Baird Textile argued that there was a duty to give 
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reasonable notice before it was dropped, but faced the difficulty that no long-term 
supply agreement had been concluded. M&S argued that each delivery was a 
discrete transaction. The Court of Appeal held there could be no implied contract 
because it was not necessary. ‘It could not be right,’ said Mance LJ, ‘to adopt a test 
of necessity when implying terms into a contract and a more relaxed test when 
implying a contract – which must itself have terms.’168 
By parity of reasoning, it could not be right to have automatic application of 
employment rights through statute, but then adopt a more stringent test for 
implying a contract – which must exist to have the right. Moreover, the 
implication of a contract in this context, according to the distinction drawn in 
Liverpool CC v Irwin,169 should be wholly a matter of law, or a contract ‘implied in 
law’, not one ‘implied in fact’ as the decision in James assumes. There is no basis to 
argue that the existence of a contract, which would ensure the efficacy of legal 
rights, is not a necessary incident of the worker’s employment. 
Thirdly, even if that were wrong, and we must deal with an ‘implied in fact’ 
contract, the ‘necessity test’ used in James and The Aramis is incomplete and 
outdated. The older cases, such as The Moorcock,170 Shirlaw v Southern Foundries 
(1926) Ltd,171 and Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board172 suggested that 
terms should be implied on the basis of what the parties ‘would have agreed’ had 
they been asked. But the law developed. Since Paragon Finance plc v Nash173 and 
Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman,174 the question for ‘individualised implied 
terms’ (terms implied in fact) is, what is ‘strictly necessary […] to give effect to the 
reasonable expectations of the parties’? Implied terms are not to be avoided just 
because the court does not deem them necessary or, as Mummery LJ considered, 
because there is ‘some other explanation’.175 Asking ‘what is necessary’ in isolation 
is a deeply elusive question.176 The court must ask whether the implication of the 
contract is necessary to fulfil the parties’ reasonable expectations. When an elected 
Parliament legislates to protect vulnerable people, it is a reasonable expectation 
that a tribunal or court shall not allow that purpose to be defeated. It is 
                                                     
168 ibid at [62]. 
169 [1976] UKHL 1, concerning a term implied in law, or one which arises as a necessary incident to the 
category of agreement. In this case the term was that the landlord council should keep the stairwells in 
decent repair (though tenants were also expected to do their part, and in this instance the council was not 
in breach). 
170 (1889) 14 PD 64, 68, implying a term that the owner of a pier (and not the owner of the unloading 
ship) should ensure the berth would be free from hazardous obstacles was necessary. 
171 [1939] 2 KB 206, 227, implying a term that a managing director would not be removed from his office 
for the duration of a ten-year contract with the company. 
172 [1992] 1 AC 294; see also F. Reynold QC, ‘The Status of Agency Workers: A Question of Legal 
Principle’ (2006) ILJ 323. Reynold QC was the counsel who won in Scally, but wrote this note just after 
the Court of Appeal in Muscat v Cable & Wireless plc [2006] ICR 975 held that an employee who was re-
engaged in the same job through an agency could not have suddenly lost all ERA 1996 rights. 
173 [2001] EWCA Civ 1466 at [36], [42]. 
174 [2002] 1 AC 408, 459. 
175 As is suggested in James [2008] EWCA Civ 35 at [30], [42], [51]. 
176 Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 293; [2004] ICR 1615 at [36]. 
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respectfully submitted that in James the Court of Appeal erred in the test for 
implied terms, and there was every reason to find an implied, or if not, an express 
contract and to try the substantive claim. 
The law on implied terms is continuing its development. Through Investors’ 
Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich BS,177 BCCI SA v Ali,178 The Achilleas179 and 
Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd,180 it has been consistently held that the 
best method of interpretation, or construction, is to view an agreement from the 
perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of all relevant background 
facts. In this light, implied terms are merely part of a broader process of 
construction, necessary to understand any instrument. The court should construe 
contracts, company articles and statutes in the same way: sensitive to the context 
and consistent with the purpose of the agreement. This is the best kind of 
jurisprudence, and is based on sound authority. As Denning LJ said, a judge, 
 
must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of 
Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but 
also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of 
the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the 
written word so as to give “force and life” to the intention of the 
legislature.181 
 
At its simplest the issue may come down to this. If a person would have had 
employee status, had she been directly contracted, the situation does not change 
just because an agency is interposed. A different result is not consistent. 
 
SQUARING UP 
 
Two final cases capture the state of English jurisprudence. In Astbury v Gist Ltd,182 
Mr Astbury claimed that he was an employee of Gist’s warehouse in his job of two 
and a half years. Gist supplied food to Marks & Spencer and it recruited Mr 
Astbury through Pertemps, which (remarkably like a middle management) had its 
office on-site. He applied for a permanent position three times. Three times he 
was turned down. Then he was let go and he represented himself in an unfair 
dismissal claim. He could not show he was a Gist employee. After that he got 
another job, through Adecco in Bentley’s warehouse. Mr Astbury started telling 
                                                     
177 [1997] UKHL 28. 
178 [2001] UKHL 8. 
179 [2008] UKHL 48. 
180 [2009] UKPC 11. 
181 Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher [1949] 2 KB 481, 498-499; See also, R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 219, ‘Integrity demands that the public standards of the community be 
both made and seen, so far as this is possible, to express a single, coherent scheme of justice and fairness 
in the right relation. An institution that accepts that ideal will sometimes, for that reason, depart from a 
narrow line of past decisions in search of fidelity to principles conceived as more fundamental to the 
scheme as a whole.’ 
182 [2007] UKEAT 0619/06/2803. 
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people that Bentley was his true employer. He then wrote to Adecco that he was 
terminating his contract with them. Adecco phoned Bentley, and they removed 
him from the premises. In Astbury v Bentley Motors Ltd,183 Mr Astbury was again 
turned away for want of standing. Here was a man who simply wanted to be dealt 
with squarely, and not be treated differently. It was not unreasonable for him to 
believe that the company paying his wage, giving him work, a uniform and a 
livelihood was his employer. Perhaps Mr Astbury had been dismissed fairly on 
both occasions. But he should be told this, and not told that he was different 
because he was an agency worker. 
It is not unlikely that what underlies much opinion about agency workers’ 
rights reflects the following view. When you work through an agency, you are 
going for temporary work where nobody will expect you to stay. If you want to 
leave tomorrow, you can. So the employer should therefore not have to abide by 
employment rights when you need not do the same. This is an old fashioned 
opinion about freedom of contract.184 It does not acknowledge that some people 
are more free than others, that a human is not a resource. People apply for jobs at 
agencies because they need jobs and agencies are a source of jobs. Some people 
who oppose agency worker rights consider employment rights as generally 
undesirable. But if employment rights are wrong, then they should exist for 
nobody. There does not seem to be any good reason for singling out agency 
workers as a special category of unprotected people, or as part of a broader group 
of the most vulnerable, who will not benefit from the bare minima in UK 
employment rights. If we want to continue living in a two-tier society, with a 
growing underclass of women, migrants, young people and manual labourers who 
have little more than a minimum wage and compensation for injuries, the present 
situation is good. But if that is not acceptable, then it must be recognised that 
agency workers should not be treated differently. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Should agency workers be treated differently? No. The compelling similarity 
between people at work is the work they do, not their status. The new Directive 
should be seen as another category of anti-discrimination policy, which combats 
attempts to treat people less favourably for a status not freely chosen. But equality 
in ‘basic working conditions’, which the Directive explicitly instates, is not enough 
for UK law.  
                                                     
183 (9.5.2007) Unreported, Appeal No. UKEATPA/1844/06/DA; Underhill J decided the case on the 
basis of The Aramis and the lack of control. 
184 See Vernon v Bethell (1762) 28 ER 838; George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] QB 
284, 297; in the United States, see West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937). 
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So the changes I advocated were essentially twofold. Firstly, I argued that we 
need smarter regulation. To effectively enforce the equal rights agency workers 
will gain and to make enforcement of the existing rules realistic, agency licensing 
should be reintroduced. This would only mean making the position the same as 
for the licensees under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. I also suggested 
that more streamlined enforcement would result if EASI and the GLA were 
merged with one another. Furthermore I suggested that all fees for jobs should be 
banned, because fees in the wrong place inhibit the successful functioning of the 
labour market. The only fair exception is fees from agencies to clients, but these 
should be disclosed to all parties to ensure fees are properly negotiated and to 
ensure the Directive’s purpose of equal pay is transparently achieved. 
Secondly, I argued that typical agency workers are the employees of both the 
agency and the client. I demonstrated why a purposive approach to defining the 
word ‘employee’ is necessary and why ‘mutuality of obligation,’ as presently 
understood, is an intellectually moribund criterion, suffused with circular 
reasoning. It is circular because built into the definition of ‘mutuality of obligation’ 
is the need to have contracted for the very rights that employee status would 
guarantee. The fact that many agency workers are unable to contract for the 
minimum rights in employment legislation alone warrants that mandatory rights 
should be provided. Furthermore, both a client and an agency can be deemed joint 
and several employers. The modern view of construction and implied terms 
requires that effect be given to agencies’, workers’ and employers’ reasonable 
expectations. Courts need not refuse to find an ‘implied contract’ simply because 
there is ‘some other explanation’ for the arrangement. Everyone should expect 
that when Parliament has legislated to provide mandatory rights for the vulnerable, 
the courts would not let that aim be defeated. Britain loses by sticking with its 
laissez faire attitude towards productive economic policy, and will gain greatly when 
the courts remove these legal anomalies. The work-wage bargain does not change 
because an agency is in the middle. 
